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IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] 
SGHC 123 
by ADELINE CHONG on AUGUST 15, 2018 
In IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2018] SGHC 123, the Singapore High 
Court had the occasion to discuss and resolve various meaty private international law 
issues. The facts concerned the alleged negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation by 
the defendants on the fuel consumption of a specific model of engine that was sold 
and installed into ships owned by the plaintiffs. The issue before the court was 
whether the Singapore courts had jurisdiction over the misrepresentation claim. The 
defendants were German and Norwegian incorporated companies so the plaintiffs 
applied for leave to serve the writ out of Singapore. This entailed fulfilling a 3 stage 
process, following English common law rules: (1) a good arguable case that the case 
falls within one of the heads set out in the Rules of Court, Order 11, (2) a serious issue 
to be tried on the merits, and (3) Singapore is forum conveniens on applying the test 
set out in The Spiliada [1987] AC 460. Stages (1) and (3) were at issue in the case. 
The judgment, by Coomaraswamy J, merits close reading. The main private 
international law issues can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Choice of law is relevant when assessing the heads of Order 11 of the Rules of 
Court. 
The plaintiffs had relied on Order 11 rule 1(f) and rule 1(p). Rule 1(f) deals with 
tortious claims and the court proceeded by ascertaining where the tort was 
committed. According to the court, this question was to be answered by the lex fori. 
If the tort was committed abroad, the court held that choice of law for tort then came 
into play: the court must then determine if the tort satisfied Singapore’s tort choice of 
law rule, ie the double actionability rule. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal 
in Rickshaw Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 had 
held that the double actionability rule will apply even in relation to local torts (as the 
flexible exception may displace Singapore law to point to the law of a third 
jurisdiction). The double actionability rule thus remains relevant when assessing 
Order rule 1(f) whether the tort is committed abroad or in Singapore. 
(b) ‘damage’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is not limited to direct damage. 
Order 11 rule 1(f)(ii) is in these terms: ‘the claim is wholly or partly founded on, or is 
for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in Singapore caused by a 
tortious act or omission wherever occurring.’ The court held that ‘damage’ for the 
purposes of rule 1(f)(ii) included the increased fuel expenditure and reduction in 
capital value of the ships due to the fuel inefficient engines suffered not just by the 
original owners of the ships at the time of the misrepresentation, but also the 
subsequent purchasers of the ships. On the facts, the court held that the damage 
suffered by the subsequent purchasers arose directly from the misrepresentation as 
the misrepresentation was also intended to be relied upon by them. Further, the 
court held that, even if that had not been the case, direct damage is not required 
under rule 1(f)(ii). The difference in wording between Order 11 rule 1(f) and the UK 
CPR equivalent (CPR PD6B para 3.1(9)) makes the decision on this point less 
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controversial than the reasoning in Four Seasons v Brownlie [2017] UKSC 80, 
[2018] 1 WLR 192. 
(c) The test used to ascertain whether ‘the claim is founded on a cause of action 
arising in Singapore’ for the purposes of Order 11 rule 1(p) differs from the substance 
test which applies to determine the loci delicti in a multi-jurisdictional tort situation 
for the purposes of the double actionability rule. 
The former test derives from Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 
458. The court observed that the Distiller’s test is more plaintiff-centric compared to 
the substance test used for the purposes of the double actionability rule because 
Order 11 rule 1(p) ‘requires the court to view the facts of the case through the cause of 
action which the plaintiff has sought to invoke.’ Whereas, the latter test is ‘the more 
general and more factual question “where in substance did the tort take place.”’ 
(para [166], emphasis in original). This point will likely be revisited by the Court of 
Appeal, not least because it had, as the court itself acknowledged, cited 
the Distillers test as authority for the substance test in JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral 
Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391. 
(d) Whether Singapore is forum conveniens for the purposes of a setting aside 
application and whether Singapore is forum non conveniens for the purposes of a 
stay application should be assessed with reference to current facts. 
Norway and Germany were potential alternative fora for the action. After leave had 
been given to serve out of jurisdiction in the ex parte hearing, the plaintiffs 
commenced proceedings in Norway as a protective measure. No proceedings were 
commenced in Germany. This meant that, under the Lugano Convention, the 
Norwegian courts had priority over the German courts. The court treated this as 
indicating that the courts of Germany ceased to be an available forum to the parties. 
This was significant, given that the court had earlier held that the loci delicti was 
Germany. The defendants argued that the commencement of Norwegian proceedings 
was to be ignored and the application to set aside service out of jurisdiction was to be 
assessed solely with reference to the facts which existed at the time when leave to 
serve out of jurisdiction was granted. The effect of the defendants’ argument would 
be that the setting aside application would be determined on the basis that Germany 
was an available forum, while their alternative prayer for a stay would be determined 
on the basis that Germany was an unavailable forum. The potential for wastage in 
time and costs is clear on this argument and the court rightly took a common sense 
and practical approach on this issue. 
(e) The possibility of a transfer of the case from the Singapore High Court (excluding 
the SICC) to the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) is a relevant 
factor in the Spiliada analysis. 
This had previously been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rappo, Tania v Accent 
Delight International Ltd [2017] 2 SLR 265. The SICC is a division of the Singapore 
High Court which specialises in international commercial litigation. Its rules allow 
for a question of foreign law to be determined on the basis of submissions instead of 
proof. Further, the bench includes International Judges from not only common law 
but also civil law jurisdictions. The court held that the specific features of the SICC 
and the possibility of the transfer of the case to the SICC weighed in favour of 
Singapore being forum conveniens compared to Norway and Germany. 
(f) In a setting-aside application, where the plaintiffs have succeeded in showing that 
Singapore is the prima facie natural forum in the first stage of the Spiliada test, the 
burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial 
injustice if the action were to proceed in Singapore. 
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In an Order 11 case, the second stage of the Spiliada test usually operates to give the 
plaintiffs a second bite of the cherry should they fail to establish Singapore is the 
natural forum under the first stage of the test. The plaintiffs are allowed to put 
forward reasons why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial takes place in the 
natural forum abroad. Very interestingly, the court held that where, as on the facts of 
the case, the plaintiff had already satisfied the burden of showing that Singapore is 
the natural forum under the first stage of the Spiliada test, the burden then shifts to 
the defendants to show why they would suffer substantial injustice if trial took place 
in Singapore. 
The case is on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Its judgment is eagerly anticipated. 
 
